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Modernity and Modernities: Processes and Endpoints 
Throughout the world many scholars in the humanities and social sciences work on the contemporary situation. 
Some highlight the diversity they see in a world with ever increasing kinds of connections. The local is part of the 
global; particular situations are created out of the engagement of global forces and local conditions. Many others see 
a common endpoint toward which all of us are moving. Some proponents of the common future with similar traits 
see us reaching this point by a common path of change, while others consider multiple paths leading to a single 
cluster of traits defining a universal modernity. Scholars disagree over whether modernity is best conceived 
principally as a common set of conditions arrived at by a single or multiple paths or whether modernities are plural 
and created out of the engagement of local and global factors. This paper will stress the other main conceptual 
choice we can take for framing the processes and endpoints of historical change. This approach focuses on the ways 
that different histories define different trajectories of change that make possible the possibilities for diverse 
endpoints to history. Of course these endpoints are connected to each other through global economic, political and 
cultural connections, but the connections themselves are only part of the story. If we think of some local point of 
study and consider the ways in which it is connected to the global without also pondering how the local is itself the 
continuing product of dynamics beyond the local but not by any means global we make it too easy to ignore the 
histories that continue to shape the realities in which people construct their lives today. 
In this paper I will focus on economic change as a concrete focus for exemplifying these arguments. My point is 
not to substitute a historical perspective on economic development for one that looks primarily at contemporary 
problems and possibilities but rather to argue that only by considering the ways in which a modern economy 
simultaneously has some traits that are shared with most of all other modern economies at the same time that there 
are particular features that emerge not from engagement with global forces but out of historical dynamics that we 
can gain a sharper and deeper understanding of how economic development takes place. The intellectual payoffs for 
approaching economic development specifically and modernity more generally in this fashion is that it invites us to 
identify what is specific and what is more common through empirical investigation rather than based on assumptions 
driven by a theoretical perspective about what modern economies or modernity in general should look like. For 
China specifically, this approach encourages us to break down a very common stereotype that imagines the Chinese 
past to be the source of obstacles and problems, while connections to the larger global system afford both 
opportunities and difficulties. Just as global connections can be positive or negative, I think we can conceive 
historical patterns of change to yield positive possibilities as well as serious problems. One advantage of focusing on 
economics is that scholars tend to think of the demands of economic change as universal, while we more readily 
acknowledge that there are particular histories of cultural beliefs and practices. These are often thought of as 
“traditions” that confront what is “modern” as a set of external traits. Less frequently do scholars think about how 
the modern is created out of both internal and external traits and very rarely do the internal traits have their own 
histories of change. 
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Economic Growth before the Industrial Revolution 
Economies grow when division of labor promotes specialization and increases commercial exchange. In the 
several centuries preceding the late eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution, this was the most important reason that 
people became more productive and as a consequence were able to improve their standards of living. This process 
was encouraged by connecting areas that previously had not traded, either by improving the physical infrastructure 
for transport or removing political barriers to trade. People traded more when the costs of doing business declined; 
these include the production costs as well as those related to exchange.  
The work in the new institutional economics has stressed the importance of lower transaction costs as a principal 
means for encouraging economic growth. The creation of secure property rights is associated with the use of written 
contracts that are enforceable in courts of law and the absence of government-controlled commerce, which 
facilitates rent sought by those with power to the detriment of efficient allocation of resources. Nobel Prize winning 
economist Douglass C. North contrasts the commercial institutions in different European countries to show why 
England and the Dutch Republic were superior to the Spanish empire. Largely lacking have been efforts to compare 
institutional alternatives that yield roughly similar results in terms of economic growth before the Industrial 
Revolution.  
China is one of the principal areas to look for these possibilities because it is a very large stretch of territory 
across which trade networks and routes of what would be international trade between European countries expanded 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. In Europe court records in Bruges, Amsterdam and London show 
increased numbers of contracts that are adjudicated in ways that enforce property rights and increase the security of 
doing business over long distances. Often these long-distance trade involved a delay between a merchant’s receiving 
of goods and paying for them since the merchants who received the goods had first to make some sales to have the 
cash to pay for what had been shipped to him. Alternatively, he might have gotten a loan to pay for the goods and 
needed to repay his creditors once he sold his goods. In either case long-distance trade involved credit transactions. 
The development of private financial markets was aided by the development of public finance. War making 
European rulers never had enough money available in their treasuries to pay for the armaments and soldiers they 
needed to compete with other rulers. As a consequence, they were repeatedly in need of loans. England was most 
successful in creating long-term debt and persuading lenders that it would honor its debts, a condition making it 
easier for them to get subsequent loans. 
China had no large courts specializing in the adjudication of contract disputes among merchants. Nor did the 
Ming or Qing state develop institutions for a public debt that could in turn encourage the formation of private credit 
institutions. Yet Ming and Qing dynasty China did have large amounts of long-distance trade and the eighteenth-
century state especially was able to manage a fiscal system able to promote material welfare and social order across 
an agrarian empire. China’s long-distance trade was organized by merchant groups who shared a combination of 
native place and kinship ties. The largest and most successful of these groups established themselves in many 
market towns and could organize long-distance trade between themselves and handle disagreements within their 
own organizations rather than through negotiation and adjudication in some impersonal court of law. We might even 
say the sophistication of Chinese commercial organization made the need for government institutions to promote 
trade less important.  
In contrast, if we turn to the organization of textile handicrafts we find a different kind of comparison between 
Chinese and European practices. In England especially the development of putting out is often interpreted to be an 
important institutional development for the subsequent emergence of factory production. Putting out is the process 
of textile production in which a merchant advances the raw materials to weaving households who in turn is paid a 
piece rate for what they produce. Chinese households who weaved cloth were independent operators who could buy 
their raw materials on markets and sell their finished products on markets; they relied, in other words on a 
combination of factor and product markets to produce their craft goods. Their factor markets specifically substituted 
for the merchant organizing putting out in the English case. For the production of crafts, both systems were effective. 
Europeans had more experience of having craft production in cities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
urban factories with the technologies of the Industrial Revolution followed both earlier urban practices and the 
transformation of putting out practices. Yet it is easy to misunderstand the significance of these differences between 
China and Europe. First, urban factory location before the Industrial Revolution was in general terms not clearly an 
advantage economically. Cities had higher mortality rates than the countryside because of public health problems 
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and higher food supply costs; thus labor costs were higher in cities than in the countryside. Second, differences in 
the organization of rural textiles did not affect the relative attractiveness of urban manufacture; when the 
technologies making urban textile production economically superior to craft production became available to 
entrepreneurs working in China in the early twentieth century, they had little problem getting a work force to serve 
their needs. This second point leads us to consider the dynamics of economic growth after the Industrial Revolution 
more generally. 
Economic Growth after the Industrial Revolution 
Smithian dynamics of commercial expansion are basic economic factors in the contemporary world. But since the 
early nineteenth century, economies have also grown because of technological advances. Where people have been 
able to take advantage of the new production opportunities such changes made possible, economies have grown. The 
first places to do so were in northwest Europe and North America, but a few decades later, sites in Asia also became 
important. How did the new possibilities for economic growth travel? 
The question of how technological change diffuses can be broken down into several questions about who transfer 
technology, through what institutional means and for what purposes they do so. Do foreign capitalists bring in 
capital and technology or do native governments or entrepreneurs purchase the technologies? Are the products light 
industrial goods meant for private consumption or heavy industrial goods used by the state for its military defense? 
In the late nineteenth century governments in both Asia and Europe were keen to import new technologies, 
especially those needed for the heavy industries used to build up their military. Businessmen in Europe and the 
United States, in contrast, exported technologies for other purposes, such as mining. In neither case did these kinds 
of technological movements bring many direct economic benefits to people living outside Europe and North 
America. Other technologies that officials and businessmen introduced into Asia, including those used for textiles 
and railroads, brought benefits to local people. Of course there were many parts of Asia and in particular many parts 
of China where such technologies did not immediately reach, so only some parts could benefit.  
Earlier scholarship contrasted Chinese and Japanese responses to the economic challenges and opportunities 
posed by Western contact in terms of Japanese success and Chinese failures. Some talked about Japanese being 
more responsive than Chinese to opportunities, while others suggested that the Japanese were spared the scale of 
pressure faced by China and was thus afforded more time and space to develop their plans than the Chinese had 
been (Frances Moulder, Japan, China and the modern world economy: toward a reinterpretation of East Asian 
development ca. 1600 to ca. 1918 (1977)). Missing from these accounts is an explanation of how similar the Chinese 
and Japanese efforts were in many regards.  
Benjamin Elman’s recent assessment of Chinese science and technology includes analyses of some late 
nineteenth century changes. He argues that the Chinese tradition of natural studies and Western science developed 
together beginning in the 1860s and that both highly educated literati, the social stratum from which officials were 
recruited, and more modestly educated artisans, were drawn to modern science and technologies entering the empire 
from the West. Furthermore, these developments began a decade before similar changes would have taken place in 
Japan. For their part, Japanese visited Chinese arsenals and shipyards to learn how to develop imported technologies. 
(Benjamin Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550—1900, 2005: 283-395)  
One reason the Chinese efforts seem less significant is that they take place within a far larger polity and there are 
many places that are little affected, if at all, by the initial economic changes. But if we take the same spatial scale in 
Europe rather than focusing exclusively on those parts experiencing economic growth in the opening decades of the 
nineteenth century, we would also find large amounts of territory, as close to England as Ireland, and as large as 
central Europe that were lacking in much transformation. Industrial development necessarily starts in particular 
places. How quickly or completely such changes in one area come to affect other places depends on the kinds of 
political and economic connections that are formed between industrializing places and other areas as yet unaffected. 
When the People’s Republic was established in 1949, the political economy of industrialization included several 
important and distinctive features that drew on past experiences. The stress on developing a heavy industrial base to 
make the country’s defenses strong was a priority first articulated in the 1870s by Qing officials wishing to better 
defend the country against foreign military might. Twentieth-century Chinese governments also recognized the 
importance of heavy industry; the peopleÿs government had ambitious plans to build an industrial base that it was 
unable to achieve, while the Japanese built considerable industry in their puppet state of Manchukuo. The People’s 
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Republic was by no means unique in the priority it assigned to industry; poor countries at the mid-twentieth century 
typically associated industrialization with economic development. The Chinese approach of the 1950s is typically 
understood in terms of its resemblance to the Soviet strategies on which some of its principles were based. But the 
state’s desire to develop an industrial base in many parts of the country resonated with earlier state efforts to develop 
the economy in more peripheral areas. Though the technological basis for creating security was very different in the 
1950s from what it had been in the 1750s, both depended on extending advanced economic practices of the day to 
more backward places.  
The Chinese approach to agriculture initially committed the state to implementing land reforms that resolved 
problems of unequal land ownership that had vexed earlier generations of officials concerned about social 
inequalities. Collectivization made it possible for the state to simplify the rural world within which most Chinese 
still lived at the same time as it increased the state’s control over their lives. Earlier Chinese emperors would have 
been able to understand the goals of social order and social control achieved by the Communists and perhaps even 
envy the degree to which they were successful. The Communists succeeded in radically reducing the role of 
commerce and other kinds of horizontal networks in society reaching beyond villages and local market places. The 
degree to which the Communists created small rural locales quite isolated from each other as well as from cities 
would have impressed the Ming dynasty founder, Zhu Yuanzhang who believed some six centuries earlier that the 
ideal social order contained self-sufficient peasants who could live in isolation from neighboring villages, merchants 
and any other outsiders, save the occasional visit by some officials. Of course China in the 1950s had a legacy of 
several centuries of active commerce and economic growth that had made the countryÿs most advanced areas in 
the mid-eighteenth century more similar to advanced areas in Europe than either set of advanced areas was to the 
poorer locales in China and Europe. This makes the Communist achievement of state simplification all the more 
surprising. It also makes it not at all surprising that the simplification and control implemented by the state would 
not in fact last more than three decades. 
The past quarter century has witnessed an economic surge of unprecedented scale in world history-the spatial 
reach and temporal length of rapid growth has in many ways confounded expectations about how economic growth 
should take place. With poorly specified property rights, limited amounts of contract law, and a poorly functioning 
banking system, Chinese township and village enterprises created a kind of industrialization that did not require the 
migration of its laborers from the countryside into large cities. Instead, people stayed close to home as they began 
working in factories and through their efforts began to urbanize in modest ways the countryside. 
Chinese economic development in the twentieth century shows both similarities to changes taking place 
elsewhere that have gone largely unappreciated and differences that emerge out of a path-dependent set of 
possibilities unlike those in more familiar Western cases. 
Path Dependence in an Age of Globalization  
In economic terms, the first three decades of the People’s Republic witnessed state planned development which 
achieved a kind of national integration that first recovered some of the connections achieved within the late imperial 
empire and then went well beyond those to create a new kind of political economy in which the state became far 
more important because of its own capacities outstripped those of the late imperial state and it removed the potential 
competition to its power that could emerge in a more commercialized economy. In contrast, the reform era economy 
first rebuilt and refashioned connections to foreign economies that had first been created between the mid-nineteenth 
and mid-twentieth centuries. Now the economic challenges facing the government can be seen in light of these two 
dimensions of path-dependent possibilities. Now that the national economy is increasingly integrated into a global 
economy, the challenges of bringing the advantages of economic development to the western half of the country 
brings new content to the older priorities of creating political and economic integration. These are basic economic 
features of China’s modernity that cannot be adequately understood without comprehending their historical 
dimension.  
To stress the importance of path dependent changes that involve distinctive trajectories of change leading to 
particular conditions hardly means that there aren’t an increasing number of traits shared between Chinese and 
foreign industrialized economies. Nor is it to say that some of the possibilities confronting Chinese entrepreneurs are 
not clearly defined by a global market place. But it does mean that simply seeing the global and local or 
alternatively focusing on the similar dynamics of change leading to a range of endpoints similar to those found 
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elsewhere fails to engage some of the basic issues confronting people engaged in making China more modern. A 
conscious awareness of path dependence can allow people to make choices in a more informed way and be prepared 
for contingencies and unintended consequences that continue to be influenced by dynamics of historical change 
running deeply from the past into the present. 
